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“THE LATTER TEND ALSO TO BE THE FORMER”
Gray, Colin S. National Security Dilemmas: Challenges and Opportunities. Washington, D.C.: Potomac
Books, 2009. 334pp. $29.95

Colin Gray’s highly engaging book addresses a spectrum of national security
considerations that are likely to impact
the United States in the coming years.
Gray, who is a professor at the University of Reading and served for five years
in the Ronald Reagan administration,
argues that America’s sports-mindedness
has culturally prepared Americans to
think in terms of winning and losing
and of confrontations that have a beginning, middle, and end. In this light,
the former expression of art “Global
War on Terrorism,” one that President
Obama has dispensed with, leads us to
overlook the eternal nature of the struggle against individual and small-group
violence. Gray convincingly observes
that the conflict the United States has
embarked upon after September 11
“bears more resemblance to a protracted hunt than it does to what most
people understandably call a war.”
Gray warns that although we cannot
control surprise, we can control our reaction to it—a particularly important
observation for the current geostrategic
environment. His call for the United
States to develop a “detailed, culturally

empathetic understanding of its new
adversaries” is particularly apt. One is
left with the task of struggling to choose
which arguments should be highlighted.
Even the chapter on understanding revolutionary changes in warfare, a topic
that received too much attention after
the 1991 Persian Gulf war, is rewarding.
Gray points out that though the term is
of use, one cannot assess the true nature
of a potential revolution in military affairs (RMA) outside the wider political,
strategic, and social context. For example, Germany’s successes in May 1940
were due as much to French mistakes as
to Nazi military innovation.
In addition, at a number of points
throughout the book Gray makes the
cogent point that the United States
could easily spend too much time looking for, or attempting to create, the
next RMA and put too little effort into
understanding social and cultural
changes in how it views war. I believe
Gray coined the term “Revolution in
Attitudes toward the Military” to argue
that variations in acceptable military
practices and the need to understand
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the cultural implications of violence
will be increasingly important.
I would offer two minor critiques. Gray
may have set the bar too high when he
argues at length that the United States
suffers “a persistent strategy deficit.”
Doesn’t history offer more than a handful of examples of powerful states that
demonstrated superb long-range strategic planning, in particular during
peacetime? I wonder if one can agree
with the great majority of Gray’s individual critiques on American strategic
practices and yet be skeptical that a
broad-gauge indictment is warranted.
Also, when I read the brief section in
which he argues that al-Qa‘ida could
potentially be deterred, I remained unconvinced. The facts that al-Qa‘ida protects its key members and that some of
the organization’s support system may
be deterrable are far from demonstrating that “the organization itself . . .
should be eminently deterrable.” However, these are two minor points regarding a commendable work that engages a
wide array of security considerations
and offers much engaging and original
thinking.
As Gray notes regarding his subtitle,
“the latter tend also to be the former.”
Colin Gray’s work offers many important arguments and observations that
will help identify both.
ANDREW L. STIGLER

Naval War College

Stuart, Douglas T. Creating the National Security
State: A History of the Law That Transformed
America. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press,
2008. 342pp. $38.50

Douglas Stuart holds the J. William
Stuart and Helen D. Stuart Chair in International Studies, Business and
Management at Dickinson College and
is an adjunct professor at the U.S. Army
War College. He provides an insightful
history of the struggle to reform completely the U.S. national security establishment from 1937 to 1960, an effort
that resulted in the creation of the Department of Defense, the National Security Council (NSC), the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), and three
separate armed service departments under a secretary of defense.
This extensively researched study of the
political and bureaucratic battles to establish control over the national security establishment holds invaluable
lessons for those interested in the current efforts to reform the joint, interagency system to better develop,
resource, and execute a coherent national security policy and strategy.
Prior to World War II, Edward
Pendleton Herring of Harvard identified problems with the existing foreign
and defense policy-making system. The
United States was wedded to isolationism and antimilitarism, with narrow
domestic political interests that shaped
its foreign and defense policies.
Pendleton Herring introduced the
“concept of national security” and was
visionary in proposing an alternative
national security system. Pearl Harbor
quickly changed the way Americans
thought about security. The fact that
the United States was attacked from
such distance firmly “established the
concept of national security as an unchallengeable standard against which all
future foreign policy decisions were to
be made.”
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